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Abstract
We provide a characterization of the obligation rules in the context of
minimum cost spanning tree games. We also explore the relation between
obligation rules and random order values of the irreducible cost game -
it is shown that the later is a subset of the obligation rules. Moreover
we provide a necessary and sucient condition on obligation function
such that the corresponding obligation rule coincides with a random order
value.
1 Introduction
There is a wide range of economic contexts in which aggregate costs have to be
allocated amongst individual agents or components who derive the benets from
a common project. A rm has to allocate overhead costs amongst its dierent
divisions. Regulatory authorities have to set taxes or fees on individual users
for a variety of services. If several municipalities use a common water supply
system, they must reach an agreement on how to share the costs of operating it.
In most of these examples, there is no external force such as the market, which
determines the allocation of costs. Thus, the nal allocation of costs is decided
either by mutual agreement or by an arbitrator on the basis of some notion of
distributive justice. The main thrust of this area of research is the axiomatic
analysis of allocation rules. Such an axiomatic analysis is supposed to enlighten
an arbitrator on the possible interpretations of fairness while dividing the cost
among the participants.
In this paper, we pursue this axiomatic analysis of cost allocation rules for
a specic class of cost allocation problems known as Minimum Cost Spanning
G. Berganti~ nos thanks the nancial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Educaci on y
Ciencia and FEDER through grant SEJ2005-07637-C02-01/ECON and the Xunta de Galicia
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1Tree Problems or in short mcstp. The common feature of these problems is
that a group of users has to be connected to a single supplier of some service.
For instance, several towns may draw power from a common power plant, and
hence have to share the cost of the distribution network. There is a positive
cost of connecting each pair of users (towns) as well as a cost of connecting each
user (town) to the common supplier (power plant). A cost game arises because
cooperation reduces aggregate costs - it may be cheaper for town A to construct
a link to town B which is nearer to the power plant, rather than build a separate
link to the plant. An ecient network must be a tree which connects all users
to the common supplier. From economic perspective, the main objective here,
is to divide the cost of ecient network among its beneciaries. Following is an
example of mcstp.
Example 1.1 See Figure 1, which depicts a minimum cost spanning tree prob-
lem. There are three agents 1; 2 and 3. The source is denoted by 0. These nodes
are represented by circles, where the connection between them are represented by
straight lines. The numbers represent the cost of each connection. For instance
the cost of connection between agent 1 and agent 3 is 2.
The early literature on minimum cost spanning tree problems mainly fo-
cussed on the algorithmic issues of nding an ecient network. Kruskal [1956],
Prim [1957] introduced two dierent versions of the greedy algorithm for this
purpose. The rst game theoretic approach to minimum cost spanning tree
problem is due to Bird (1976). Bird, by constructing an allocation rule, proved
that core of a minimum cost spanning tree problem is always non-empty. In
recent years a number of papers have analyzed this problem from economic
perspective and the literature has grown into two dierent direction. In one
hand Granot and Huberman (1984), Kar (2002), Berganti~ nos and Vidal-Puga
(2006a) and Berganti~ nos and Vidal-Puga (2006b) have discussed various trans-
ferable utility games and used them to construct allocation rules, on the other,
Norde, Moretti and Tijs (2004), Tijs, Branzei, Moretti and Norde (2006) and
Lorenzo-Freire and Lorenzo (2006) have developed a class of allocation methods,
known as the obligation rules.
Granot and Huberman (1984) introduced a TU game associated with the
minimum cost spanning tree problem and analyzed the structure of it's core and
nucleolus. Kar (2002) characterized the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) of this
game. Berganti~ nos and Vidal-Puga (2006a) introduced the irreducible form of
a minimum cost spanning tree problem and looked at an alternative TU game
based on the irreducible form. They also characterized the Shapley value of
this new games in terms of monotonicity type axiom. Parallel to this literature,
Tijs, Branzei, Moretti and Norde (2006) introduced a class of allocation rules
for minimum cost spanning tree problems, known as the obligation rules. A
common feature of the Obligation rules is the fact that players have the possi-
bility to control the cost allocation problem during the construction procedure,
i.e. edge by edge following the Kruskal algorithm, of the minimum cost span-
ning network. Via such a step-by-step cost allocation procedure, players specify
2how to share the cost of each edge according to a predetermined cost allocation
protocol, namely the obligation functions. Lorenzo-Freire and Lorenzo (2006)
characterized the obligation rules in terms of a restricted additivity property.
In this paper we seek to bridge the gap between these two stream of litera-
ture. We show that the obligation rules are actually a generalized version of the
Shapley value. To be precise, we prove that the random order values (which is
itself a generalization of the Shapley value) is a subset of the obligation rules.
We also provide a necessary and sucient condition to distinguish random or-
der values from the obligation rules. and nally characterize the obligation
rules with two basic monotonicity properties, namely population monotonicity
and strong cost monotonicity. By focussing on the obligation rules, we try to
argue that if one is looking for allocation rules that share the nice properties
of the Shapley value but not anonymous, then obligation rules are the natural
candidates.
In Section 2, we introduce the minimum cost spanning tree problem. In
Section 3 and 4, we discuss the random order values and the obligation rules
respectively. Section 5 explores the relation between random order values and
the obligation rules. Characterization of the obligation rules are provided in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes this paper by looking at the probabilistic values
for general TU games and their relation with the obligation rules.
2 Minimum cost spanning tree problems
Let N  N = f1;2;:::g be the set of all possible agents. We are interested in
networks whose nodes are elements of a set N0 = N [ f0g, where N  N is
nite and 0 is a special node called the source. Usually we take N = f1;:::;jNjg
where jNj denotes the cardinal of the set N. Let N denote the set of all orders
in N: Given  2 N; let Pre(i;) denote the set of elements of N which come
before i in the order given by ; i. e. Pre(i;) = fj 2 N j  (j) <  (i)g:As









be the simplex in RA:
A cost matrix C = (cij)i;j2N0 on N represents the cost of direct link between
any pair of nodes. We assume that cij = cji  0 for each i;j 2 N0 and cii = 0 for
each i 2 N0. Since cij = cji we will work with undirected arcs, i:e (i;j) = (j;i):
We denote the set of all cost matrices over N as CN. Given C; C0 2 CN we
say C  C0 if cij  c0
ij for all i;j 2 N0: Analogously, given x; y 2 RN; we say
x  y if xi  yi for all i 2 N: A minimum cost spanning tree problem, brie
y
an mcstp; is a pair (N0;C) where N  N is the set of agents, 0 is the source,
and C 2 CN is the cost matrix. Given an mcstp (N0;C); we dene the mcstp
induced by C in S  N as (S0;C).
3A network g over N0 is a subset of f(i;j) such that i;j 2 N0g: The elements
of g are called arcs: Given a network g and i;j 2 N0, we say that i;j 2 N0
are connected in g if there exists a sequence of arcs f(ih 1;ih)g
l
h=1 satisfying
(ih 1;ih) 2 g for all h 2 f1;2;:::;lg, i = i0 and j = il. A tree is a network
satisfying that for all i 2 N, there is a unique sequence of arcs f(ih 1;ih)g
l
h=1





where i0 represents the rst agent in the unique path in t from i to 0: Given an





When there are no ambiguities, we write c(g) or c(C;g) instead of c(N0;C;g).
A minimum cost spanning tree for (N0;C), brie
y an mt; is a tree t such
that c(t) = minfc(t0) : t0 is a treeg. It is well-known in the literature of mcstp
that an mt exists, even though it does not necessarily have to be unique. Given
an mcstp (N0;C) we denote the cost associated with any mt t in (N0;C) as
m(N0;C):
Given an mcstp (N0;C) and an mt t, Bird (1976) denes the minimal net-
work (N0;Ct) associated with t as follows: ct
ij = max
(k;l)2 tij
fcklg, where  tij denotes
the unique path in t from i to j. Even though this denition is dependent on
the choice of mt t, it is independent of the chosen t. Proof of this can be found,
for instance, in Aarts and Driessen (1993). The irreducible form of an mcstp
(N0;C) is dened as the minimal network (N0;C). If (N0;C) is an irreducible
problem, then we say that C is an irreducible matrix. Berganti~ nos and Vidal-
Puga (2006a) proves that (N0;C) is irreducible if and only if there exists an mt
t in (N0;C) satisfying the two following conditions:
(A1) t = f(ip 1;ip)g
n
p=1 where i0 = 0.






Example 2.1 Let (N0;C) be a mcstp as in Example 1.1. The irreducible ma-
trix associated with (N0;C) is depicted in Figure 2.
One of the most important issues addressed in the literature about mcstp
is how to divide the cost of connecting agents to the source among them. A




fi (N0;C) = m(N0;C): As usually, fi (N0;C) represents the
cost allocated to agent i. In this paper we focus on the Obligation rules and
random order values. We discuss each of these in detail in Section 4 and 3
respectively. In Section 6, we characterize the obligation rules. Following are
the axioms, we will be using in this paper.
Strong cost monotonicity (SCM). For all mcstp (N0;C) and (N0;C0) such
that C  C0, f (N0;C)  f (N0;C0)
4SCM says that if a number of connection costs increase and the rest of
connection costs (if any) remain the same, no agent can be better o.
SCM is called cost monotonicity in Tijs et al (2006) and solidarity in
Berganti~ nos and Vidal-Puga (2006a).
Population monotonicity (PM): For all mcstp (N0;C), S  T  N, and
i 2 S, we have
fi (T0;C)  fi (S0;C):
PM says that if new agents join a "society" no agent from the "initial
society" can be worse o.
The following property is a weak form of anonymity. It says that if two
agents are identical in terms of their connection costs then their cost shares
must be equal.
Equal Treatment of Equals (ETE): Let (N0;C) be a mcstp such that for
some i; j 2 N, cki = ckj for all k 2 N0 n fi;jg. ETE says that fi (N0;C) =
fj (N0;C).
Next property was introduced in Branzei et al (2004).
Cone-wise positive linearity (CPL): Let (N0;C) and (N0;C0) be two mcstp






such that for all i;j;k;l 2 N0 satisfying that  (i;j)   (k;l); then cij  ckl
and c0
ij  c0
kl: Thus, for each x;x0 2 R+
f (N0;xC + x0C0) = xf (N0;C) + x0f (N0;C0):
This property is an additivity property restricted to some subclass of prob-
lems.
It makes no sense to claim additivity in all mcstp because m(N0;C + C0)
could be dierent from m(N0;C)+m(N0;C0): See Berganti~ nos and Vidal-Puga
(2006b) for a detailed discussion on this issue.
Constant share of extra cost (CSEC):
Let (N0;C); (N0;C0); (N0;Cx) and (N0;C0x) be a set of mcstp satisfying
the following conditions:
 For all i 2 N; c0i = c0, c0
0i = c0
0, cx
0i = c0 + x; and c0x
0i = c0
0 + x where
x 2 R+:
 For all i;j 2 N; cij = cx





fi (N0;Cx)   fi (N0;C) = fi (N0;C0x)   fi (N0;C0):
This property is interpreted as follows. A group of agents N faces two
problems (N0;C) and (N0;C0). In both problems all agents have the same
connection cost to the source (c0i = c0 and c0
0i = c0
0). Moreover, this cost is
5greater than the connection costs between agents (cij  c0 and c0
ij  c0
0). Under
these circumstances, an mt implies that any one agent connects directly to the
source, and that the rest connect to the source through this agent. Agents
agree that the correct solution is f. Assume that an error was made and that
the connection cost to the source is x units larger. CSEC states that agents
should share this extra cost x in the same way in both problems.
This property is a generalization of the property of Equal Share of Extra
Costs (ESEC) dened in Berganti~ nos and Vidal-Puga (2006a). ESEC says
that x must be divided equally among agents.
A game with transferable utility, brie
y a TU game, is a pair (N;v) where
v : 2N ! R satises that v (;) = 0. Based on a mcstp, we can dene a TU game
as follows. Given (N0;C), for each coalition S  N; consider the aggregate cost
of a minimum cost spanning tree. That is vC(S) = m(S0;C) for all S  N. Kar
(2002) axiomatized the Shapley value of vC. On the other hand Berganti~ nos
and Vidal-Puga (2006a) characterized the Shapley value of a game associated
with the irreducible form. This game is dened as, vC(S) = m(S0;C) for all
S  N: In this paper we will concentrate on the later and explore its relation
with the obligation rules.
3 The random order values of the irreducible
game
Weber (1988) denes the random order values of a TU game (N;v). The idea
is the following. Agents arrive sequentially. Each agent receives his marginal
contribution to his predecessors. To each probability distribution over the set
of possible orders, we can dene the random order value giving to each agent
his expected marginal contribution.
Let (N) be the simplex in RN: For each w = (w)2N 2 (N) we
dene the random order value ROV w associated with w as follows. Given the





w (v (Pre(i;) [ fig)   v (Pre(i;)))





















A[v (S [ fig)   v (S)]
6We dene the family of rules W in mcstp as the random order values of the
game vC: That is, given w 2 (N), we dene fw (N0;C) = ROV w (N;vC)











A[vC (S [ fig)   vC (S)] (1)
and
W = ffw : w 2 (N)g:
A well known member of W is the Shapley value. Let us denote this rule
by .  = fw, where w is such that all the orders have equal weight. That
is w() = 1
j(N)j for all  2 (N). Berganti~ nos and Vidal-Puga (2006a)
provides a characterization of , in terms of SCM; PM; and ESEC. Following
is an example of random order values.
Example 3.1 Let (N0;C) be a mcstp as in Example 1.1. The TU game asso-
ciated with C is as follows,
vC(f1g) = vC(f2g) = 4; vC(f3g) = 6, vC(f1;2g) = 6, vC(f1;3g) =
vC(f2;3g) = 10, vC(f1;2;3g) = 12.
Let w() = 1
j(N)j for all  2 (N): Then, fw
1 (N0;C) = fw
2 (N0;C) = 3
and fw
3 (N0;C) = 6.
4 Obligation rules
Tijs et al (2006) introduce the family of obligation rules in mcstp: They prove
that each obligation rule satisfy SCM and PM: In this section we present two
axiomatic characterizations of obligation rules. In the rst one we characterize
obligation rules as the only rules satisfying SCM; PM; and CPL: In the second
one we characterize obligation rules as the only rules satisfying SCM; PM; and
CSEC:
We rst introduce obligation rules formally. We present this denition in
a way a little bit dierent from Tijs et al (2006) in order to adapt it to the
objectives of our paper.
Given a network g we dene P (g) = fTk (g)g
n(g)
k=1 as the partition of N0
in connected components induced by g: Namely, P (g) is the only partition of
N0 satisfying the following two properties: Firstly, if i;j 2 Tk (g); i and j are
connected in g Secondly, if i 2 Tk; j 2 Tl and k 6= l; i and j are not connected
in g:
Given a network g; let S (P (g);i) denote the element of P (g) to which i
belongs to.
Kruskal (1956) denes an algorithm for computing an mt: The idea of the
algorithm is to construct a tree by sequentially adding arcs with the lowest
7cost and without introducing cycles. Formally, Kruskal's algorithm is dened
as follows. We start with A(C) = fi;j 2 N0 j i 6= jg and g0 (C) = ;:
Stage 1: Take an arc (i;j) 2 A(C) such that cij = min
(k;l)2A(C)
fcklg: If there










Stage p+1: We have dened the sets A(C) and gp (C). Take an arc (i;j) 2
A(C) such that cij = min
(k;l)2A(C)
fcklg: If there are several arcs satisfying this
condition, select just one. Two cases are possible:
1. gp (C) [ f(i;j)g has a cycle. Go to the beginning of Stage p + 1 with
A(C) = A(C) n f(i;j)g and gp (C) the same.




= (i;j); A(C) =





Stage p + 2:
This process is completed in jNj stages. We say that gjMj (C) is a tree
obtained following Kruskal's algorithm. Notice that this algorithm leads to a
tree, but that this is not always unique.
When there is not ambiguity we write A; gp; and (ip;jp) instead of A(C);
gp (C); and (ip (C);jp (C)) respectively.
Given N  N; an obligation function for N is a map o assigning to each
S 2 2N n f;g a vector o(S) which satises the following properties.
o-i) o(S) 2 (S):
o-ii) For each S;T 2 2N n f;g, S  T and i 2 S, oi (S)  oi (T):
To each obligation function o we can associate an obligation rule fo. The
idea is as follows. At each stage of Kruskal's algorithm an arc is added to the
network. The cost of this arc will be paid by the agents who benet from adding
this arc. Each of these agents pays the dierence between his obligation before
the arc is added to the network and after it is added. See Tijs et al (2006) for
a more detailed discussion.
We now dene fo formally. Given an mcstp (N0;C); let gjNj be a tree
















  oi (S (P (gp);i))

where, by convention, oi (T) = 0 if the source is in T:
We dene the family of obligation rules as
O = ffo : o is an obligation functiong
Let us clarify the idea of obligation rules with an example.
8Example 4.1 Let (N0;C) be a mcstp as in Example 1.1. An obligation func-
tion o is as follows, oi(S) = 1
jSj for all i 2 S and for all S  N. Let us follow
Kruskal's algorithm and compute the cost allocation for C.











Step 3: The arc (0;2) is the cheapest among the rest, but this will form a cycle.
Hence we pick the next cheapest arc, which is either (1;3) or (2;3). There is a





Now, we can compute the allocation,
fo
1 (N0;C) = c12 [o1(f1g)   o1(f1;2g)] + c10 [o1(f1;2g)   0] + c10 [0   0] = 3
Similarly fo
2 (N0;C) = 3. Finally,
fo
3 (N0;C) = c12 [o3(f3g)   o3(f3g)]+c10 [o3(f3g)   o3(f3g)]+c10 [o3(f3g)   0] =
6
Next, we provide an alternative representation of obligation functions. This
representation will be used later to establish the relationship between W and
O.
4.1 Alternative representation of obligation functions
Given N  N; an obligation function for N is a map d assigning to each
















In Theorem 4.1 we will show that above two denitions of an obligation
function are equivalent. That is, given an o, one can identify a d and vice versa.
We will denote these mappings by d(o) and o(d) respectively. Let us rst
describe d(o) and o(d). We start with some new notations. Suppose o is an
obligation function for N. Let @(o) (or @(d)) denotes the set over which o (or
d) is an obligation function. That is @(o) = N. For the rest of this paper, we
will use @(o) and N interchangeably as per convenience. Let us also dene a
new mapping o k from the set [2Nnfkg n f;g] as follows. o k(T) = o(T) for all
T  N n fkg. It is immediate that o k is an obligation function for N n fkg.
Thus @(o k) = N n fkg.
Description of d(o):
For all i 2 S; d
i(S;o) = oi(S) when j@(o)nSj = 0 1. Suppose we have already
dened d
i(S;o), i 2 S, for all obligation functions o and coalitions S such that
1Which simply means, for all i 2 N, d
i (N;o) = oi(N)
9j@(o) n Sj < m. Now we dene d
i(S;o), i 2 S, for all coalitions S  @(o) such




i(S [ fkg;o) (2)
Note that, j@(o)nSj = m implies j@(o k)nSj < m and j@(o) (S[fkg)j < m
and hence d
i(S;o k) and d
i(S [ fkg;o) are well dened.
To complete the description, let us illustrate that d does not depend on
the choice of k 2 @(o) n S either. For j@(o) n Sj < 2, this is vacuously true.
We can use induction to prove it in general. Assume that our assertion is
correct for all o, S  @(o) such that j@(o) n Sj < m. Let us prove that the
same is true for S, such that j@(o) n Sj = m. Since m  2, there are at
least two agents in @(o) n S. Suppose k;l 2 @(o) n S. Now, we will show that
for all i 2 S, d
i(S;o k)   d
i(S [ fkg;o) = d
i(S;o l)   d
i(S [ flg;o). Since
j@(o k) n Sj = m   1 and j@(o) n (S [ fkg)j = m   1, by induction hypothesis
d
i(S;o k) and d







































i(S [ l;o k)   d
i(S [ fk;lg;o)

[(o l) k = (o k) l ]
= d
i(S;o l)   d
i(S [ flg;o) [by Equation 2 and induction step]
Description of o(d):






Theorem 4.1 : o and d are equivalent. That is,
1. o(d(o)) = o:
2. d(o(d)) = d:
3. d(o) satises d-i and d-ii.
4. o(d) satises o-i and o-ii.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.
Let us now provide an example to illustrate this equivalence.
Example 4.2 : N = f1;2;3;4g. An obligation function o is described as fol-
lows, oi(S) = 1
jSj for all i 2 S for all S  N. Alternative representation of this
obligation function is as follows. For all i 2 S;
di(S) =
 1
4 if jSj = 1;4
1
12 if jSj = 2;3
10One can verify that d(o) = d and o(d) = o. We illustrate these for a couple





















































The next example illustrates that it is not necessary to have di(S)  0 for
all i 2 S and for all S  N. This observation will play a crucial role while
exploring the relationship between W and O.
Example 4.3 : N = f1;2;3;4g. Consider an obligation function ^ o, as in
Example 4.2 except for the set f1;2;3g.
^ oi(f1;2;3g) =
 1
2 if i = 1
1
4 Otherwise
It is straightforward to check that o satises o-i and o-ii. Note that
d


















Since o and d are equivalent, for the rest of this paper, instead of d(o) and
o(d), we will simply write d(o) and o(d) respectively.
4.2 Alternative representation of obligation rules
The alternative representation of obligation functions, that is d; gives rise to
a new denition of the obligation rules. This representation will reveal the
essential similarity between the obligation rules and the random order values.
In the process, a natural interpretation of d also emerges. The main result of
this section is the following theorem, which rewrites the obligation rules in terms
of d.





di (NnS;o)[vC (S [ fig)   vC (S)] (4)
Proof. See Appendix 8.2.
A quick look at Equation 1 and Equation 4 conrms that they are closely
related. Before proceeding to the next section, where this relation will be in-
vestigated thoroughly, let us end the current discussion with an interpretation
of d. To this end, the following result will be extremely helpful.
Proposition 4.3 Let o be an obligation function. Then
X
SNnfig
di (NnS;o) = 1









di (T;o) = oi (fig;d)
The last equality follows from Equation 3: By Theorem 4.1, o(d(o)) = o:
Thus, X
SNnfig
di (NnS;o) = oi (fig;d) = oi (fig) = 1:
Proposition 4.3 tells us that fdi(N n S;o) j S  N n figg acts as an weight
system for fo
i (N0;C) in Equation 4. In the same spirit, Weber (1988) introduced
a class of `marginalist values' for transferrable utility games. In Section 7 we
will formally introduce marginalist values and farther discuss their relation with
obligation rules.
5 Relation between W and O
In the next theorem we study the relationship between W and O. The rst part
shows that obligation rules are nothing but generalized random order values.
Next, we identify a necessary and sucient condition to distinguish between
obligation rules and random order values. In part (iii) we propose an obligation
rule and show that it does not belong to the set of random order values when
population size is strictly greater than 3. If population is less than or equal to
3, then random order values and obligation rules coincide. This is illustrated in
corollary 5.1 as an immediate consequence of part (ii).
Theorem 5.1 : W and O are related as follows,
12i) W  O:
ii) Let o be an obligation function. fo 2 W , di(S;o)  0 for all i 2 S and
for all S  N.
iii) If jNj > 3; then W  O.
Proof. See Appendix 8.3.
Corollary 5.1 If jNj  3, then W = O.
Proof: Suppose N = f1;2;3g and o is an obligation function on N. By
d-ii di(N;o)  0 for all i 2 N: Now suppose S = f1;2g. Let us show that
d1(f1;2g;o)  0. The proof is exactly the same for all S with jSj = 2 and all
i 2 S.
d1(f1;2g;o) = [d1(f1;2g;o 3) d1(f1;2;3g;o)] = [o1(f1;2g) o1(f1;2;3g)]  0
The last inequality follows from o-ii. Next we show that d1(f1g;o)  0.








)   d1(f1;3g;o 2)]   d1(f1;2g;o)
= [o1(f1g)   o1(f1;3g)]   [o1(f1;2g)   o1(f1;2;3g)]
= [1   o1(f1;3g)]   [1   o2(f1;2g)] + [1   o2(f1;2;3g)   o3(f1;2;3g)]
= [o3(f1;3g) + o2(f1;2g)]   [o2(f1;2;3g) + o3(f1;2;3g)]
= [o2(f1;2g)   o2(f1;2;3g)] + [o3(f1;3g)   o3(f1;2;3g)]  0
Thus when jNj = 3, for all S  N, and for all i 2 S, di(S;o)  0. By part
(iii) of Theorem 5.1, fo 2 W implying O  W. Hence by part (i) of Theorem
5.1, W = O. When jNj  2 the proof is similar and thus omitted.
We say that  o is a simple obligation function if for each S  N and i 2 S;
 oi (S) is either 1 or 0: Let SO denote the family of all simple obligation functions.
Consider the family of obligation rules induced by obligation functions which
are a convex combination of simple obligation functions. Next corollary says
that this family is just W:
Corollary 5.2 f 2 W if and only if f = fo
$





$ o oi (S) and (w o) o2SO 2 (SO):
Proof: See Appendix 8.4
The idea of the proof is quite simple. Given a simple obligation function we
can associate an order  2 N and vice versa. Now it is easy to prove that W
is the subfamily of O generated by convex hull of simple obligation functions.
136 Axiomatization of O
In the next theorem we give two axiomatic characterizations of obligation rules.
Theorem 6.1 Let f be a rule in mcstp.
(a) f satises SCM; PM; and CPL if and only if f 2 O:
(b) f satises SCM; PM; and CSEC if and only if f 2 O:
Proof. See Appendix 8.5.
.
Remark 6.1 The properties used in Theorem 6.1 are independent. See Ap-
pendix 8.6 for a proof.
Berganti~ nos and Vidal-Puga (2006b) introduce the property of Restricted
Additivity (RA). They prove that RA is stronger than CPL; i:e: if a rule f sat-
ises RA; f also satises CPL: Lorenzo-Freire and Lorenzo (2006) characterize
obligation rules as the only rules satisfying RA and SCM: However, RA and
CPL behaves in a dierent way. SCM is a consequence of RA and PM, whereas
SCM is independent of CPL and PM: Moreover, the proof of the uniqueness
part in both results is completely dierent. Based on our axiomatization of
obligation rules, we present an alternative characterization of .
Corollary 6.1 Let f be a rule in mcstp. f satises SCM; PM; and CSEC
and ETE if and only if f = .
Proof: See Appendix 8.7
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have tried to bridge the gap between the two streams of
literature, that have evolved recently, on minimum cost spanning tree games.
We have explored the structural relation between the obligation rules and the
random order values and established that random order values are a subset of
the obligation rules. In this section we compare our results to Weber (1988).
The following denitions are due to Weber.
A value f is called a marginalistic value if for each i 2 N there exists
pi 2 RfS:SNnfigg such that
P
SNnfig




pi (S)(v (S [ fig)   v (S))
14A value f is called a probabilistic value if for each i 2 N there exists a
probability pi 2 (S : S  Nnfig) such that for all TU game (N;v); fi (N;v)




pi (S)(v (S [ fig)   v (S))




Weber showed that the marginalistic values are the only rules to satisfy
linearity and dummy axiom over SU. He also proved that on top of linearity
and dummy, if a value satisfy monotonicity axiom then it must be a probabilistic
value.
A value  satises linearity if (v1+v2) = (v1)+(v2) and (c:v) = c:(v),
where (N;v1), (N;v2); (N;v) are TU games and c is a scalar.
Suppose a TU game (N;v) is such that for all S  N n fig, v(S [ fig) =
v(S) + v(fig): A value  satises dummy if i(v) = v(fig).
Suppose a TU game (N;v) is such that for all S  Nnfig, v(S[fig) v(S) 
0: A value  satises monotonicity if i(v)  0.
Note that neither marginalistic values nor probabilistic values demand e-
ciency, that is
P
i2N i(v) = v(N). The parallel between our results and Weber
is captured in the following theorem.
Let the class of marginastic values for mcstp is dened as follows. MV =
ffp j pi 2 RfS:SNnfigg and
P
SNnfig




pi (S)[vC (S [ fig)   vC (S)]
Similarly the class of probabilistic values for mcstp will be denoted as, PV =




pi (S)[vC (S [ fig)   vC (S)]
Theorem 7.1 (a) O  MV: Moreover, for all i 2 N and all S  Nnfig;
pi (S) = di (NnS;o):
(b) O \ PV = W
This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.1.
In this paper we have emphasized the importance of the obligation rules for
minimum cost spanning tree problems and explored its link with other standard
allocation methods. A future research agenda will be to dene and characterize
obligation rules for the general TU games.
158 Appendix
We prove the results stated in the paper.
8.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We prove this result in several steps. These are as follows,
Step 1: o(d(o)) = o.
Step 2: d(o(d)) = d.
Step 3: d(o) satises d-i.
Step 4: d(o) satises d-ii.
Step 5: o(d) satises o-i.
Step 6: o(d) satises o-ii.
Proof of step 1: We want to show that for all S  N, for all i 2 S,
o
i(S;d(o)) = oi(S). This is trivially true when j@(o) n Sj = 0, because by





i(@(o);o) = oi(@(o)). We will use induction on
j@(o) n Sj to prove this result. Suppose our assertion is correct for all S, for
all i 2 S, such that j@(o) n Sj < . We will show that the same is true when





























































i (S) (by induction hypothesis)
= oi(S)
Proof of step 2: We want to prove that for all S  N, for all i 2 S,
d






di(T) = di(@(d)). We will use in-
duction on j@(o) n Sj to prove this result. Suppose our assertion is correct for
all S, for all i 2 S, such that j@(o)nSj < . We will show that the same is true
when j@(o) n Sj = .
From step 1, we have, o(d(o)) = o. Letting o = o(d), we get o(d(o(d))) =






















The last step follows from the induction step, which implies d
i(T;o(d)) =
d
i(T), for all T such that S  T  @(d).
















j(S [ fjg;o) for all S 
@(o). Let us rst show that the above is true when j@(o) n Sj = 1. With-



















i(@(o);o) (because @(o k) = S and @(o) = S [ fkg). Thus by













Now, suppose that we have proved this result for all S such that j@(o)nSj <
. We will prove the same when j@(o)nSj = . Without loss of generality, assume




































































j(S [ fjg;o) + d





This completes step 3.
Proof of step 4: We know that for all i 2 @(o), d
i(@(o);o) = oi(@(o))  0















i(S [ fkg;d(o)) (by Equation 3)
= oi(S)   oi(S [ fkg) (by step 1)
 0 (by o-ii)
Proof of step 5: We need to prove that for all S  @(d), o(S;d) 2 (S).
We will show it in two parts. First, we show that o
i(S;d)  0 for all i 2 S.
If S = @(d), this is trivially true, because o
i(@(d);d) = di(@(d)) (by Equation
3) 0 (by d-ii). We will use induction on j@(d) n Sj. Suppose our assertion
is correct for all S such that j@(d) n Sj < . Let us show the same when

















i(S [ fkg;d) (by Equation 3)
 0
The last step follows from d-ii, which implies
P
ST[@(d)nfkg]
di(T)  0 and
the induction step, which implies o
i(S [ fkg;d)  0.




i(S;d) = 1. Again, this is easy to prove when











































































































































































19This proves Equation 3 and completes step 5.
Proof of step 6: We want to prove that for all S  T  @(d) and for all
i 2 S, o
i(S;d)  o
i(T;d). It is enough to show that o
i(S;d)  o
i(S [ fkg;d),
which then can be used repeatedly to complete this step. Now,
o
i(S;d)   o











 0 (by d-ii)
8.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
First, let us introduce some new notations and lemmata, which will be used
later in the main body of proof.
Lemma 8.1 If (N0;C) is an irreducible mcstp; t = f(ip 1;ip)g
n
p=1 is the mt





(a) vC (S) =
jSj P
q=1
cis(q 1)is(q) where we denote s(0) = 0:










if p < jSj and







Proof of Lemma 8.1: The proof of this result appears in Berganti~ nos and
Vidal-Puga (2006a).
Suppose g is a network on N0. A simple mcstp (N0;Cg) induced by the
network g is dened as follows, c
g
ij = 1 if (i;j) 2 g and c
g
ij = 0 otherwise.





simple mcstp and a family fxqg
(C)





















for each q 2 f1;:::; (C)g.
Proof of Lemma 8.2: The proof of this result appears in Norde et al
(2004).





simple mcstp and a family fxqg
(C)












Proof of Lemma 8.3: From Lemma 8.2, we know that given a mcstp




q=1 of simple mcstp and a family
fxqg
(C)












klg for all fi;j;k;lg  N0 and for all q 2 f1;:::; (C)g. Let us
use Prim's algorithm on C and Cg
q
for all q 2 f1;:::; (C)g. Since cost of the
edges follow the same order over these cost matrices, they must have the same
minimum cost spanning trees. Let us pick one of these minimum cost spanning




. Take any fk;lg  N0.  tkl denotes































































g for all fi;j;k;lg  N0 and for all q 2 f1;:::; (C)g.
Now by Lemma 8.1, (N0;C) has an mt, t = f(ip 1;ip)g
n
p=1. Since cost




















































(S) (by Lemma 8.1)





of simple mcstp and a family fxqg
(C)







Proof of Lemma 8.4: From Lemma 8.2, we know that given a mcstp




q=1 of simple mcstp and a family
fxqg
(C)












klg for all fi;j;k;lg  N0 and for all q 2 f1;:::; (C)g. Now, we
will use Kruskal's algorithm on C and Cg
q
for all q 2 f1;:::; (C)g. Since cost
of the edges follow the same order over these cost matrices, Kruskal's algorithm














for all q 2 f1;:::; (C)g.






















































































































Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 4.2.






i (NnS;o)[vC (S [ fig)   vC (S)]
We must prove that for any mcstp (No;C), f0(No;C) = fo(No;C).




q=1 of simple mcstp and
a family fxqg
(C)









). On the other hand, by Lemma





















































Hence it will be enough to prove that fo (N0;C) = f0 (N0;C) when C is a
simple problem.
C partition N0 into (S0;S1;:::;Sm) as follows: If i;j 2 Sk; then cij = 0.
If i 2 Sk; j 2 Sl; and k 6= l; then cij = 1. Without loss of generality we
can assume that 0 2 S0: It is trivial to see that fo
i (N0;C) = 0 if i 2 S0 and
fo
i (N0;C) = oi (Sk) if i 2 Sk; k 6= 0:
We now compute f0
i (N0;C): Assume that i 2 S0: Since vC (S [ fig) =
vC (S) for all S  Nnfig; we have that
f0
i (N0;C) = 0 = fo
i (N0;C):






i (NnS;o)[vC (S [ fig)   vC (S)]










i (T;o) = oi (Sk)
where the last equality follows from Equation 3.
238.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1
The following lemmata will be used in the proof of part (ii).
Lemma 8.5 Let ot be an obligation function for N, for all t 2 f1;2;;g.
Suppose o is a convex combination of these obligation functions. That is, for











td(ot): Alternatively, if d =
 P
t=1
tdt, where dt is an obligation




Proof of Lemma 8.5: One can easily check that indeed o is a valid
obligation function for N, that is it satises o-i and o-ii. Thus d(o) is also




tdi(S;ot). This is easy to show when S = @(o), because







tdi(@(o);ot). Suppose we have
proved this result for all S, such that j@(o) n Sj < : We will prove the same

































tdi(S;ot) (by Equation 2)
Alternatively, suppose d =
 P
t=1
























This completes the proof of Lemma 8.5.
2@(o) = N
24Lemma 8.6 Suppose there are two sets of nonnegative real numbers f1;2;;sg






j. Then for all i  s and for all j  t,
we can nd nonnegative real numbers 
j
i which satisfy the following conditions.











Proof of Lemma 8.6: We will prove this result by induction on s. If s = 1,
we can choose 
j
1 = j for all j  t. Thus condition (a) is trivially satised. Since
j  0, we have 
j









Let us now assume that our hypothesis is true for all s < . We will prove
that the same for s = . Let us rst divide s into fj
sgt
j=1 as follows. Let
1
s = min(s;1). If s < 1, that is 1
s = s, then there is nothing to be
distributed among fj
sgt
j=2 and hence j
s = 0 for all j = 2;3;;t. Otherwise
1
s = 1 and we distribute the residual of s, that is (s   1) among fj
sgt
j=2.
We follow this procedure repeatedly and at each step set j
s = min(residual of
s;j). Whenever the residual is 0 all the following j
s are set to 0: Formally,




























s = s. Also note that by construction, j
s  0 for all j  t. This reduces
the construction to a smaller problem where we can use induction. Formally, the
residual problem is represented by f1;2;;s 1g and f 1;  2;;  tg, where

















 j. By induction hypothesis, there exists nonnegative 
j
i for all i  (s   1)
and j  t such that (a) and (b) are satised for the residual problem. Now it is
easy to check that these f
j
igi(s 1); jt along with fj
sgjt constitute a possible
construction for the original problem.

















i =  j
is ensured by the induction hypothesis.











25Lemma 8.7 Let  2 N. An obligation function o is dened as follows. For












1 if S = fjj(j)  jN n Sjg and (i) = minj2S (j)
0 otherwise
Proof of Lemma 8.7: Once again we use induction on j@(o)nSj. This is
easily done when j@(o) n Sj = 0, because di(@(o);o) = o
i (@(o)), which is 1
for i such that (i) = minj2@(o) (j) and 0 otherwise. Suppose our assertion
is true for all S such that j@(o) n Sj < . We will show the same when
j@(o) n Sj = . Choose any k = 2 S. Let us dene an order  k on N n fkg as
follows. For all i; j 2 N n fkg;  k(i) <  k(j) , (i) < (j). One can easily
check that o(










 k))   di(S [ fkg;o)
i

















(1   0) = 1 if (i) = minj2S (j)
(0   0) = 0 otherwise
For all other S, if possible let us pick an k, such that (k) < (j) for all j 2 S.














 k))   di(S [ fkg;o)
i
= 0   0 = 0
Finally, all S such that S = @(o) n fkg; where k 6= minj2@(o) (j) are not















and S [ fkg = fjj(j)  j@(o) n (S [
fkg)jg. Moreover, since k 6= minj2@(o) (j), we have (i) = minj2S (j) ,








(1   1) = 0 if (i) = minj2S (j)
(0   0) = 0 otherwise
This completes the proof of Lemma 8.7.




Proof of Lemma 8.8: From Equation 1, we know that if we can nd a












A[vC (S [ fig)   vC (S)]
for all i 2 N and for all mcstp (N0;C) then we are done. By Equation 4, for all









[vC (S [ fig)   vC (S)]
Thus all we need to nd is a weight system ( ^ w)2N 2 (N); such that for








Let us consider the following weight system ( ^ w)2N ;
^ w =

1 if  =  
0 otherwise











Lemma 8.9 Let w 2 (N) and ow =
P
2N




Proof of Lemma 8.9: From the denition of the obligation rules using











































































27The result follows immediately from Lemma 8.8 and the fact that W is a
convex set.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: This proof has three steps.
(i) W  O:
(ii) Let o be an obligation function. fo 2 W , di(S;o)  0 for all i 2 S and
for all S  N.
(iii) If jNj > 3; then W  O.
Proof of (i): Suppose fw 2 W. Let (N0;C) be a mcstp. From Equation











A[vC (S [ fig)   vC (S)]
Let us dene for all S  N and for all i 2 N n S,









^ di (NnS;o)[vC (S [ fig)   vC (S)]
To complete the proof, we need to show that ^ d is an obligation rule, that is,




















Also for all S  N,
X
j2NnS





























Pre(j;) = N n [S [ fjg]
































Pre(i;) = N n S



























Checking d-ii: This follows trivially from the fact that w  0 for all  2 N.
Proof of (ii):
Proof of \ ) ": This follows immediately from part (i). For all S  N and for
all i 2 S, di (S;o) =
P
fjPre(i;)=NnSg
w  0 because w  0 for all  2 N.
Proof of \ ( ": Let o be an obligation function on N such that
di(S;o)  0 for all i 2 S and for all S  N (8)




is given by Equation 7, then by Lemma 8.9, fo 2 W. In the rest of this proof
we use induction on jNj to show, o =
P
2N
wo for some w 2 (N).
Suppose jNj = 2. Without loss of generality we can assume N = f1;2g.
From d-i we know that d1(f1;2g;o) + d2(f1;2g;o) = 1. Moreover d1(f1g;o) =
d2(f1;2g;o) and d2(f2g;o) = d1(f1;2g;o). By assumption 8, d1(f1g;o), d2(f2g;o);
d1(f1;2g;o) and d2(f1;2g;o) are all non negative3. It can be easily checked that
o can be written as follows,
o = d1(f1;2g;o)  o1 + d2(f1;2g;o)  o2
where 1 and 2 denote the natural order and it's reverse respectively. Now, let
us assume that our assertion is true for all N such that jNj < . We show that
the same is true when jNj = . Once again we use a chain of claims to establish
this result. The scheme of the proof is as follows.
Claim 7: There exist obligation functions fdkgk2N on N such that d(o) = P
k2N
dk(N;o)  dk, where for all k 2 N, dk satises the following conditions.
3By d-ii these are anyway non negative, afact which we explore in corollary
29(a) For all S  N and for all i 2 S, dk




1 if i = k
0 otherwise
(c) If k 2 S  N; then for all i 2 S, dk
i (S) = 0
Claim 8: Suppose (dk) k represents the restriction of dk on N n fkg. That is
for all S  N n fkg and for all i 2 S, (dk)
 k
i (S) = dk
i (S). Then (dk) k is an








i (S) = dk
i (S)  0. Since (dk) k is an obligation function on









where Nnfkg is the set of all orders on N n fkg and w 2 (Nnfkg). Now,
we can use  k to dene a new order (k; k) on N. (k; k) starts with k and
then follows exactly the same sequence as in  k. For all k 2 N and for all
 k 2 Nnfkg we can dene obligation functions o(k;
 k) by Equation 7.





By claim 7, we have d(o) =
P
k2N




























The last inequality follows from the fact N = [k2Nfj(k) = 1g =
[k2Nf(k; k)j k 2 Nnfkgg.
For all  2 N, let us denote the coecient of o by  w. That is  w =























dk(N;o) (as w 2 (Nnfkg))
= 1 (by d-i)
Thus indeed  w 2 (N) and o =
P
2N
 wo. To complete the proof of part
(iii), now we get back to the proves of claim 7, 8 and 9.
Proof of claim 7: Without loss of generality we can assume that dk(N;o) > 0
for all k 2 N (otherwise, if there exist an l such that dl(N;o) = 0, then choose
any obligation function dl satisfying (a), (b) and (c) and apply rest of the proof
on N n flg). We need to show that there exist obligation functions fdkgk2N on
N such that d(o) =
P
k2N
dk(N;o)dk, where for all k 2 N, dk satises properties
(a), (b) and (c). Note that if we can construct such fdkgk2N, then each dk will
trivially satisfy the property d-ii of obligation rules because of (a)4. Moreover




i (N) = 1. So while constructing fdkgk2N, apart
from (a), (b) and (c), we need to ensure the following properties








j(S [ j) for all S  N





i (S)] = di(S;o), for all i 2 S and for all S  N.
We will use induction on jSj. If S = N, then the possibility of such a






i(S) = di(N;o). Suppose we have been able to construct fdk(S)gk2N
for all jSj > , satisfying the properties listed above. We will now construct the
same for S  N such that jSj = . Let us x such an S.
To satisfy (c), we set dk
i (S) = 0 for all i 2 S and k 2 S. This will change


















j(S [ j). The second inequality
follows from the induction step, property (c) and the fact that k 2 S )
k 2 S [ fjg for all j = 2 S.
4Property (a) implies that dk
i (N)  0 for all i 2 N . Similarly for all S  N; for all




i (T)  0.


















Now we construct the remaining elements, that is fdk
i (S)gi2S;k2NnS. Let




j(S [ j) for all k 2 N n S: Let i = di(S;o) for all i 2 S.
Note that, by Equation 8 figi2S are nonnegative numbers and by induction





































The last equality follows from the induction hypothesis and property (c), as
k 2 S implies dk







































Applying Lemma 8.6 on figi2S; fkgk2NnS, we can nd nonnegative real num-
bers fk















the description of fdk(S)gk2N. By construction, they satisfy properties (a), (b)
and (c). To complete the induction step, we now show that (d  ) and (e  ) are also
satised.
















































i = i = di(S;o).
Proof of claim 8: We will show that o
 
(dk) k
= [o(dk)] k, that is for
























From property (c), we have dk
i (T[fkg) = 0 for all T  Nnfkg and from property
(b), dk












i (T) = oi
 
S;(dk) k
. Thus (dk) k is an obligation rule on
N n fkg.












us remind the readers that o(k;
 k) is dened by Equation 7 and dk satises the
properties of claim 7. ^  = (k; k) represents an order on N; where ^ (k) = 1.
Suppose S  Nnfkg. From Equation 7 it is immediate that (o^ ) k = o(
 k).














w k  o^ 
i (S) = oi(S;dk).
Otherwise if k 2 S, then for all i 2 S and i 6= k, we have o^ 








w k  0 = 0. Since o^ 
k(S) = 1 and
w 2 (Nnfkg); we have
P
 k2Nnfkg




w k  1 = 1.
On the other hand by property (c), o(S;dk) =
P
STN
dk(T) = dk(N). Thus
by property (b), oi(S;dk) = 0 for all i 2 S, i 6= k and ok(S;dk) = 1: Hence P
 k2Nnfkg
w k  o^ 
i (S) = oi(S;dk) for all i 2 S.
Proof of (iii): It will be enough to construct an obligation function ^ o which
violates the condition di (S;o)  0 for some i 2 S and S  N. Note that such
an obligation function has already been described in example 4.3 when jNj = 4.
We will extend that example here for arbitrary N.
33Let N = f1;2;;ng. An obligation function ^ o is described as follows. For
all S  N and for all i 2 S, ^ oi(S) = 1
jSj except when S = f1;2;(n   1)g.
^ oi(f1;2;;(n   1)g) =
(
1
(n 2) if i = 1
(n 3)
(n 2)2 otherwise
It is easy to check that ^ o satisfy o-i. Let us verify that ^ o satises o-ii. We
have to show for all S  T and for i 2 S, ^ oi(S)  ^ oi(T). First consider all
S; T such that S,T 6= f1;2;(n   1)g. Then ^ oi(S) = 1
jSj > 1
jTj = ^ oi(T) for
all i 2 S. Next, suppose S = f1;2;(n   1)g. There is only one superset
of f1;2;(n   1)g, that is T = N. Thus ^ o1(S) = 1
(n 2) > 1
n = ^ o1(T). For
all i 2 S n f1g, we have, ^ oi(S) =
(n 3)
(n 2)2  1
n = ^ oi(T), because jNj = n  4.
Finally if T = f1;2;(n 1)g, then jSj  (n 2). Therefore, in case 1 2 S, we
have ^ o1(S) = 1
jSj  1




(n 2)2 = ^ oi(T). Hence ^ o satises o-ii and it is indeed an obligation function.
However note that
d
1(f1;2;;(n   2)g; ^ o)
= d
1(f1;2;;(n   2)g; ^ o (n 1)))   d




f1;2;;(n   2)g;(^ o (n 1)) n

  d
1(f1;2;;(n   2);ng; ^ o (n 1))]
 [d
1(f1;2;;(n   1)g; ^ o n)   d
1(N; ^ o)]
= [^ o1(f1;2;;(n   2)g)   ^ o1(f1;2;;(n   2);ng)]



















Hence f ^ o = 2 W. This completes the proof.
8.4 Proof of Corollary 5.2
Proof of \ ) ": Let fw 2 W: For each  2 N; let o be the obligation function
dened as in Claim 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.
Because of the proof of STEP 1 of the proof of Theorem 3, fw = fo
w
where





i (S): For each o 2 SO we
dene wo = w if o = o for some  2 N and wo = 0 otherwise. Since






Proof of \ ( ": Let fo
0
be such that for each S  N and i 2 S; o0
i (S) = P
o2SO
wooi (S) and (wo)o2SO 2 (SO):
34For each o 2 SI we dene the order o 2 N as follows.
o (1) = fi 2 N : oi (N) = 1g:
In general, for each k = 2;:::;jNj;
o (k) =

i 2 N n fo (1);:::;o (k   1)g :
oi (N n fo (1);:::;o (k   1)g) = 1

:
Let w = (w)2N be such that w = wo if  = o for some o 2 SO
and w = 0 otherwise. Since (wo)o2SO 2 (SI); (w)2N 2 (N): Hence,
fw 2 W:
Let ow be the obligation function associated with w as in the proof of STEP
1 of the proof of Theorem 3. It is trivial to see that ow = o0:
Because of the proof of STEP 1 of the proof of Theorem 3, fw = fo
w
.
Therefore, fw = fo
0
:
8.5 Proof of Theorem 6.1
The proof of this theorem is a consequence of the following claims.
Claim 1. If f satises CPL; then f also satises CSEC:
Claim 2. If f 2 O; then f satises SCM; PM; and CPL:
Claim 3. If f satises SCM; PM; and CSEC; then f 2 O:
Proof of Claim 1. Let (N0;C); (N0;C0); (N0;Cx); and (N0;C0x) be as in
the denition of CSEC: We can nd  and 0 satisfying the following conditions:
1.  (0;i) = 0 (0;i) =
n(n+1)
2   (i   1) for all i 2 N = f1;:::;jNjg; i:e: the
arcs f(0;i)gi2N are the last arcs in the orders  and 0:














such that c c0i = x for all i 2 N and c cij = 0 other-
wise. It is trivial to see that given i;j;k;l 2 N0 satisfying that  (i;j)   (k;l);
c cij  c ckl: Moreover, given i;j;k;l 2 N0 satisfying that 0 (i;j)  0 (k;l);
c cij  c ckl:
Cx = C + Ce and C0x = C0 + Ce: Since f satises CPL;










Now, it is obvious that f satises CSEC:
35This nishes the proof of Claim 1.
Proof of Claim 2. Tijs et al (2006) prove that obligation rules satisfy SCM
and PM: The property called SCM in this paper is called cost monotonicity in
Tijs et al (2006).
Berganti~ nos and Vidal-Puga (2006b) introduce the property of Restricted
Additivity (RA). They prove that RA is stronger than CPL; i:e: if a rule f
satises RA; f also satises CPL: Lorenzo-Freire and Lorenzo (2006) prove that
obligation rules satisfy RA: Thus, obligation rules satisfy CPL:
This nishes the proof of Claim 2.
Proof of Claim 3. Let f be a rule satisfying SCM; PM; and CSEC.





0i = 1 for each i 2 S and cS
ij = 0 for each
i;j 2 S: Given S  N and i 2 S we dene oi (S) = fi
 
S0;CS
















be such that c0
ij = 0 for all i;j 2 S0:




















0 for each i 2 S:
Since f satises SCM; for each i 2 S;







Thus, o(S) 2 (S):





: Since f satises PM;










We have proved that o is an obligation function. We now prove that f = fo:
Let (N0;C) be an mcstp:
Berganti~ nos and Vidal-Puga (2006a) prove that if f satises SCM; then
f (N0;C) = f (N0;C). Thus, it is enough to prove that f = fo in irreducible
mcstp.
Let (N0;C) be an mcstp where C is irreducible. Let t = f(ip 1;ip)g
n
p=1 be
the mt in (N0;C) satisfying (A1) and (A2)
We prove that f (N0;C) = fo (N0;C) by induction over jNj: If jNj = 1;
fi (N0;C) = fo
i (N0;C) = c0i: Assume that the results holds when jNj < : We
prove it when jNj = : We consider two cases:
1. c0i1  max

cip 1ip : p = 2;:::;jNj
	
= ciq 1iq:
36We dene S = fi1;:::;iq 1g: Since f and fo satisfy PM; for each i 2 S;
fi (N0;C)  fi (S0;C) and fo
i (N0;C)  fo
i (S0;C): Moreover, for each i 2
N n S; fi (N0;C)  fi ((N n S)0 ;C) and fo
i (N0;C)  fo
i ((N n S)0 ;C):
Berganti~ nos and Vidal-Puga (2006a) prove that f(ip 1;ip)g
q 1
p=1 is an mt in
(S0;C) and f(0;iq)g [ f(ip 1;ip)g
jNj


















Now it is easy to conclude that, for each i 2 S; fi (N0;C) = fi (S0;C)
and fo
i (N0;C) = fo
i (S0;C): Moreover, for each i 2 N n S; fi (N0;C) =
fi ((N n S)0 ;C) and fo
i (N0;C) = fo
i ((N n S)0 ;C):
Since i1 2 S and iq 2 N n S; jSj <  and jN n Sj < : By induction
hypothesis, f (S0;C) = fo (S0;C) and f ((N n S)0 ;C) = fo ((N n S)0 ;C)
Thus, f (N0;C) = fo (N0;C):
2. c0i1 > max

cip 1ip : p = 2;:::;jNj
	
= ciq 1iq:













x = c0i1 ciq 1iq and
 c0
ij = 0 for all i;j 2 N0:
 c0x
0i = x for all i 2 N and c0x
ij = 0 otherwise.
 c1
0i = c0i   x for all i 2 N and c1
ij = cij otherwise.
 C1x = C:























We proved above that fi
 
N0;C0





0 for all i 2 N:
C1 satises the following condition,
c1
0i1 = ciq 1iq = max































: Because of the















Assume that x > 0 is an
integer number. Since f satises CSEC;
f(N0;C0x)   f(N0;C0(x 1)) = f(N0;C01)   f(N0;C0)




Hence, f(N0;C0x) = f(N0;C0(x 1)) + f(N0;CN): By repeating this ar-
gument we get, f(N0;C0x) = xf(N0;CN)
Let x be a rational number. We can write x =
p
q; where p and q are positive
integers. Using similar arguments to those used before we can prove that












Let x be an irrational number. Consider fxpg
1
p=1 a sequence of rational
numbers satisfying that xp  x for all p = 1;:::1 and lim











































x   xp for each i 2 N:
Therefore, for each i 2 N; 0  fi
 
N0;C0(x xp)










































This ends the proof of Claim 3.
8.6 Proof of Remark 6.1
 The rule (N0;C) = Sh(N;vC) satises CPL, CSEC and PM but fails
SCM:
 The equal division rule (that is i(N0;C) =
m(N0;C)
jNj ) satises SCM,
CPL; and CSEC but fails PM:
 For a rule that satises SCM and PM but fails to satisfy CSEC, see the
companion paper Berganti~ nos and Kar (2007b).
8.7 Proof of Corollary 6.1
It is easy to check that  satises ETE. Since  2 W  O,  is an obligation
rule and hence SCM, PM; and CSEC are satised. We now show that there
is only one rule which satises these properties. The proof is very similar to the
one used in Theorem 6.1.
Let (N0;C) be an mcstp where C is irreducible. Let t = f(ip 1;ip)g
n
p=1 be
the mt in (N0;C) satisfying (A1) and (A2).
We use induction over jNj: If jNj = 1; fi (N0;C) = c0i and hence there is
only one rule. Assume that the result holds when jNj < : We prove it when
jNj = : We consider two cases:
1. c0i1  max

cip 1ip : p = 2;:::;jNj
	
= ciq 1iq: This case is exactly the same
as in the proof of Theorem 6.1 and hence will be omitted. In this case
using induction step we get that there is only one rule f which satises
all the axioms.
2. c0i1 > max

cip 1ip : p = 2;:::;jNj
	
= ciq 1iq:













x = c0i1 ciq 1iq and
 c0
ij = 0 for all i;j 2 N0:
39 c0x
0i = x for all i 2 N and c0x
ij = 0 otherwise.
 c1
0i = c0i   x for all i 2 N and c1
ij = cij otherwise.
 C1x = C:
















The last equality follows from the fact that in C0 and C0x all agents





. However C1 is a cost matrix which is already covered
in case 1 and we know f(N0;C1) is unique. Therefore f(N0;C) is also
unique.
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